CVE-2026-32633
Glances's Browser API Exposes Reusable Downstream Credentials via `/api/4/serverslist`
Summary
## Summary In Central Browser mode, the `/api/4/serverslist` endpoint returns raw server objects from `GlancesServersList.get_servers_list()`. Those objects are mutated in-place during background polling and can contain a `uri` field with embedded HTTP Basic credentials for downstream Glances servers, using the reusable pbkdf2-derived Glances authentication secret. If the front Glances Browser/API instance is started without `--password`, which is supported and common for internal network deployments, `/api/4/serverslist` is completely unauthenticated. Any network user who can reach the Browser API can retrieve reusable credentials for protected downstream Glances servers once they have been polled by the browser instance. ## Details The Browser API route simply returns the raw servers list: ```python # glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py:799-805 def _api_servers_list(self): self.__update_servers_list() return GlancesJSONResponse(self.servers_list.get_servers_list() if self.servers_list else []) ``` The main API router is only protected when the front instance itself was started with `--password`. Otherwise there are no authentication dependencies at all: ```python # glances/outputs/glances_restful_api.py:475-480 if self.args.password: router = APIRouter(prefix=self.url_prefix, dependencies=[Depends(self.authentication)]) else: router = APIRouter(prefix=self.url_prefix) ``` The Glances web server binds to `0.0.0.0` by default: ```python # glances/main.py:425-427 parser.add_argument( '--bind', default='0.0.0.0', dest='bind_address', ) ``` During Central Browser polling, server entries are modified in-place and gain a `uri` field: ```python # glances/servers_list.py:141-148 def __update_stats(self, server): server['uri'] = self.get_uri(server) ... if server['protocol'].lower() == 'rpc': self.__update_stats_rpc(server['uri'], server) elif server['protocol'].lower() == 'rest' and not import_requests_error_tag: self.__update_stats_rest(f"{server['uri']}/api/{__apiversion__}", server) ``` For protected servers, `get_uri()` loads the saved password from the `[passwords]` section (or the `default` password), hashes it, and embeds it directly in the URI: ```python # glances/servers_list.py:119-130 def get_uri(self, server): if server['password'] != "": if server['status'] == 'PROTECTED': clear_password = self.password.get_password(server['name']) if clear_password is not None: server['password'] = self.password.get_hash(clear_password) uri = 'http://{}:{}@{}:{}'.format( server['username'], server['password'], server['name'], server['port'], ) else: uri = 'http://{}:{}'.format(server['name'], server['port']) return uri ``` Password lookup falls back to a global default: ```python # glances/password_list.py:55-58 try: return self._password_dict[host] except (KeyError, TypeError): return self._password_dict['default'] ``` The sample configuration explicitly supports browser-wide default password reuse: ```ini # conf/glances.conf:656-663 [passwords] # localhost=abc # default=defaultpassword ``` The secret embedded in `uri` is not the cleartext password, but it is still a reusable Glances authentication credential. Client connections send that pbkdf2-derived hash over HTTP Basic authentication: ```python # glances/password.py:72-74,94 # For Glances client, get the password (confirm=False, clear=True): # 2) the password is hashed with SHA-pbkdf2_hmac (only SHA string transit password = password_hash ``` ```python # glances/client.py:56-57 if args.password != "": self.uri = f'http://{args.username}:{args.password}@{args.client}:{args.port}' ``` The Browser WebUI also consumes that raw `uri` directly and redirects the user to it: ```javascript // glances/outputs/static/js/Browser.vue:83-103 fetch("api/4/serverslist
Affected packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected versions | Fixed versions |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | Glances | — | 4.5.2 |
Remediation: Upgrade to 4.5.2 or later.
References
Includes data from the GitHub Advisory Database, licensed under CC-BY 4.0.
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EPSS scores provided by the FIRST.org Exploit Prediction Scoring System.