CVE-2026-56654

Gitea: Privilege Escalation via Access Token Scope Escalation in API

Published

2026-07-21

Modified

2026-07-21

Aliases

GHSA-683j-3ff6-hh2x

Sources

github-advisory

Summary

Gitea's API endpoint for creating Personal Access Tokens (`POST /users/{username}/tokens`) is protected by a middleware (`reqBasicOrRevProxyAuth`) that is intended to require password-based authentication, preventing a compromised token from being used to mint new ones. However, when a token is passed in the `Authorization: Basic :x-oauth-basic` format, the Basic auth handler validates it and sets `AuthedMethod="basic"`, causing `IsBasicAuth=true` and fooling the middleware into passing the request. Once past the guard, the token creation handler applies no scope ceiling — it will create a new token with any requested scope regardless of the caller's scope. An attacker with a restricted token (e.g. `write:user` from a leaked CI secret) can therefore create a fully-privileged `all`-scoped token without knowing the account password. ### Data flow #### Step 1 - Token extracted from Basic auth header When the attacker sends Authorization: Basic base64( :x-oauth-basic), parseAuthBasic detects that the password is "x-oauth-basic" and treats the username field as the token: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/services/auth/basic.go#L55-L64 `VerifyAuthToken` then validates the token against the database and sets `LoginMethod = "access_token"` and `ApiTokenScope` to the token's actual scope (`write:user`): https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/services/auth/basic.go#L100-L106 #### Step 2 - `AuthedMethod` is set to `"basic"`, not `"access_token"` `Basic.Verify()` returns the user successfully, so `group.Verify()` sets `AuthedMethod` to the method's name — `"basic"` — regardless of whether a password or token was used: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/services/auth/group.go#L63-L65 #### Step 3 - `IsBasicAuth` is incorrectly set to true `AuthShared` computes `IsBasicAuth` by comparing `AuthedMethod` against the constant `"basic"`. Since step 2 set that field to "basic" for a token-authenticated request, the flag is wrong: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/routers/common/auth.go#L27 #### Step 4 - The guard is bypassed `reqBasicOrRevProxyAuth` checks only `ctx.IsBasicAuth`. Because that flag is `true`, the middleware passes and the request reaches `CreateAccessToken`: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/routers/api/v1/api.go#L392-L401 #### Step 5 - No scope ceiling in the handler `CreateAccessToken` normalizes the caller-supplied scope and assigns it directly to the new token. There is no check that the requested scope is a subset of `ApiTokenScope (write:user)`: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/routers/api/v1/user/app.go#L119-L128 ### Reproducing `tests/integration/api_token_scope_escalation_test.go` ```go package integration import ( "net/http" "testing" auth_model "gitea.dev/models/auth" "gitea.dev/models/unittest" user_model "gitea.dev/models/user" api "gitea.dev/modules/structs" "gitea.dev/tests" "github.com/stretchr/testify/assert" "github.com/stretchr/testify/require" ) // TestAPIPrivilegeEscalationViaBasicAuthToken is a proof-of-concept for two // interconnected vulnerabilities that together allow full scope escalation: // // 1. reqBasicOrRevProxyAuth() is fooled into passing when a PAT is supplied in // the Authorization: Basic " :x-oauth-basic" format. The Basic auth // handler sets AuthedMethod="basic" (the method name), so IsBasicAuth=true // even though the credential is a token, not a password. // // 2. CreateAccessToken performs no scope-ceiling check — it never verifies that // the requested scopes are a subset of the caller's token scopes. // // Combined effect: an attacker with a write:user-scoped token can create a new // token with the "all" scope, gaining full access to the account. f

Affected packages

Remediation: Upgrade to 1.27.0 or later.

References

• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-683j-3ff6-hh2x